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Spontaneous Order, Symbolic 
Interaction and the Somewhat-Less-
Hidden Hand 
 




Frederick Hayek consistently presented the concept of spontaneous 
order as an idea grounded in the “hidden hand” of Adam Smith. Theoretically, 
the Smithian hidden hand serves as a kind of deus ex machina to account for or 
dismiss an extremely wide variety of possibilities from statistical error terms to 
fate or divine intervention. In many respects, the hidden hand often functions 
as a kind of pseudo-explanation: “then something very interesting happened 
but we don’t quite know why”. Granted that this is an excellent interim 
explanation useful in many context. However, it is not an entirely satisfactory 
long-term solution. Thus, claims of “hidden hand” explanations should  always 
be seen, in part, as the jumping off points for possible further exploration 
rather than termina. While we must certainly pay attention to mystery and the 
unexplained in seeking to understand the emergence of spontaneous order, 
simply writing wide swaths of social reality off to unexplained spontaneity, 
unpredictability and chance represents merely a virtual abandonment of the 
theoretical enterprise. 
Some incautious followers of Hayek and Smith tend to treat the “hidden 
hand”, which is to say the workings and processes of economic exchange that 
Smith noted in the 18th century, as equally hidden and mysterious today. Such is 
clearly not the case, along a wide variety of fronts in economic, social and 
political theory. It is my intent in this paper to suggest that while parts of the 
hidden hand may always remain hidden, some lines of theoretical and empirical 
investigation since the 18th century – in particular the work of a group of social 
psychologists and sociologists known collectively as symbolic interactionists – 
can be read as revealing at least some of the dynamics of Smith’s hidden hand, 
and that taking into account their work and revelations is important to fuller 
understanding of the concept of spontaneous order. In this case, revealing 
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parts of what had been hidden discloses the workings of processes that are 
equally as wonderous as Smith’s ingenious metaphor of the hidden hand. 
 
Spontaneous Order is not primarily an economic issue 
 
The first point I wish to make is that, although Hayek was an economist, 
his insights about spontaneous order are not, strictly speaking, exclusively, or 
even fundamentally, economic ones. This is not intended as a criticism; merely 
the observation of an important disciplinary limit or boundary. Hayek’s 
observations about spontaneous order are, instead, an important 
interdisciplinary observation whose significance stretches broadly across many 
topics, disciplines and theoretical perspectives. 
The primary reason that spontaneous order is not a fundamentally 
economic question is simply that “order” – even economic order – is not a 
primary economic issue or concern.2 Order, even in the highly elementary 
sense my grandmother used – a place for everything and everything in its place 
– is a fundamentally pre-economic concern. It is, instead, a primary social, 
political and legal concern with arranging or prioritizing ends, and not with the 
selection of means for the attainment of those ends which is the central domain 
of economics. Thus, it is not entirely surprising that the predominantly 
economic followers of Hayek have not always been particularly interested in 
looking into the hidden hand of spontaneous order. It is not, in any respect, a 
centrally important question for them. Depending upon circumstances, markets 
are simply there or not there. It is the dynamics of markets, and not their 
emergence or constitution, where economic interest lies. 
Aspects of how to organize a market, or to get to a market and back can, 
of course, be abstracted in the familiar terms of price, cost, supply, demand, 
and the like, but such abstraction always leaves out a host of interesting things 
– aspects of what symbolic interactionists call the situation. And such 
abstracting can be very enlightening and useful. That should not distract us 
from the main point, however, that order – that is to say, a degree of 
predictability, determinacy and meaning or understandability – is simply not an 
economic issue.  
They are, loosely speaking, praxeological in nature if by that terms one 
means something like the science of human action (to borrow von Mises’ title.) 
With not too much effort, one can get from Hayek to a concern for order – 
whether economic, social or political – in several ways: through something like 
the general social-political-economic musings of a Gary Becker, or the pseudo-
economics of the sociological exchange theorists, like George Humans and 
Peter Blau. Regardless, one is on interdisciplinary group. The reality is that a 
concern for order –spontaneous or otherwise – is not in the first instance an 
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important economic question. One may be concerned, secondarily, with the 
production of spontaneous order, which is an economic issue. However, 
concern with the nature and conditions of social order is, by contrast, a central 
concern in sociology and the conditions of political order are perhaps the 
foremost question in political philosophy. 
 
Smith’s Many Influences 
 
That the hidden hand of Adam Smith continues to inspire the efforts of 
many working in the tradition of “Austrian economics” is straightforward, at 
times, almost totemic. Smith, in a totally separate intellectual tradition, has also 
served as a source of inspiration for the American pragmatists and most 
importantly for purposes of this paper, those sociologists and social 
psychologists working in the related tradition of the pragmatist philosopher 
George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) and usually known as symbolic 
interactionists. (I shall henceforth in this paper drop the term symbolic, as 
unnecessary Language-based social interaction is what I mean by interaction 
throughout.)  
George H. Mead was an American social philosopher who is generally 
seen as the fountainhead for the interactionist perspective. The sociologist 
Herbert Blumer is also by general assent, seen as the developer of 
interactionism. It is the principal purpose of this paper to explore the concepts 
of emergence and spontaneous order from interactionist perspectives first laid 
down by Mead and later sharpened by Blumer, Anselm Strauss and other 
interactionists. 
 
Interactionism as nonstructuralist sociology 
 
Broadly speaking, we can identify within contemporary sociology two 
broad positions relative to the idea of spontaneous order: “Structuralist” 
sociologies, including both the “conservative” brand running from Auguste 
Comte through Durkheim through Parsons to the present day abstracted 
empiricists, represent one such perspective. On the whole, concern with social 
structure tends to downplay, minimalize or deny entirely the significance of 
spontaneous order. 
In the same vein, we have the “radical” structuralism of the Marxists, 
with their dreary inevitabilities and dogmatism. From both a Hayekian and an 
interactionist perspective, all forms of structuralism routinely succumb to what 
Dennis Wrong long ago termed the “over-socialized conception of man”; the 
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view that human action is mostly scripted by social structure and human 
decision, action and freedom is largely epiphenomenal.  
By contrast, interactionism as the vanguard of the other position in 
sociology directly embraces the concepts of autonomous action, spontaneous 
order and emergent behavior. Like the Hayekian or Austrian Economic 
perspectives, it does not view people as tall social ants, programmed only to 
respond to the dictates of social structure, but as individuals capable of choice 
and independent action. 
 
Symbolic Interactionism: A Brief Summary 
 
Symbolic interactionism is a social science that many Hayekians, 
regrettably, will be either completely unfamiliar with or holding a rather 
jaundiced and inaccurate view of, if my experience to date is any indication. 
Interactionism and Austrian economics, along with several other subfields of 
social science and social theory, share the disturbing characteristics of what 
anthropologists – yet another notably clubby bunch – term ethnocentrism. 
Focusing primarily amongst themselves on the interests and questions raised by 
a revered founder and of greatest interest to themselves, they often tend to 
regard others not as significant others, to employ a well-known and fundamental  
interactionist term.  
In interactionist terms, such disciplinary ethnocentrism tends to produce 
what is discussed below as closed awareness contexts. Such closed awareness 
contexts, in turn, serve to limit and restrict the range of possible spontaneous 
orders. For example, it is relatively easy to predict at present that the 
possibilities of a spontaneous emergence of a major research and theoretical 
focus combining Austrian economics and interactionist social psychology are at 
present extremely low, based only on the ethnocentrism (and mutual 
exclusiveness) of the two fields of investigators. It is a principal intent of this 
paper to try to raise that probability, however slightly. 
I find this particularly regrettable in this case because interactionism 
shares a number of distinctive common perspectives with all others interested 
in the problem of spontaneous order and the related problem of independent 
social action. Further, interactionism has extended a variety of perspectives 
somewhat akin to the Austrian model of “rational choice” deeply into the 
understanding of social disorganization: deviant behavior, mental illness, 
poverty, crime and other topics.  
Herbert Blumer outlined three central premises generally acknowledged 
to define interactionism: 
1. People act toward things (including other people) on the 
basis of the meanings those things have for them; 
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2. Meanings arise out of the interaction of the individual with 
others  
3. Interpretive processes are used by the person to deal with 
his/her environment. 
Working in an intellectual tradition far from the usual precincts of the 
Austrians, interactionists and others closely aligned with them have pursued 
approaches to analyzing ordinary life originating in the literary perspectives of 
Balzac, Dickens and Zola.  In the course of doing so, they have discovered 
unmistakable tendencies of reasoned choice among skid row bums, the severely 
mentally retarded, the dying, juvenile delinquents, welfare mothers and many 
other marginal populations. Indeed, many of these insights provide at least part 
of the intellectual basis for the Austrian and other “new political economy” and 
“systems” perspectives that have enabled economists to venture forth from the 
counting rooms and marketplaces and offer perspectives on all human 
behavior. 
Part of what makes all of this so difficult to sort out is that 
interactionists have until recently been almost completely silent – at least 
overtly – on matters of general economic and political theory.3 At the same 
time, Hayek and Mises, like many of their followers, despite their general 
theoretical or praxeological interests, were not notably loquacious or 
convincing on matters of social psychological and microsocial interest – 
tending primarily to encourage along with their grand theorizing, varieties of 
social and behavioral reductionism in which the full interesting, terrible and 
glorious range of human behavior is reduced to a series of quaisi-economic 
demands and price behavior said to be exhaustively explainable through their 
own interpretations of the mechanisms of rational choice and markets. Let me 
hasten to add that there is much to talk about here, but it cannot be a one sided 
conversation with others devoted only to learning the Austrian wisdom, nor a 
mutual hurling of verbal fusillades over the barricades. 
Writing in the interactionist tradition reveals a singular focus on the 
micro-social behavior of ordinary, everyday life that is, upon first glance, 
notably void of those same grand motifs of economics and politics so abundant 
in the Austrian tradition. Skid row alcoholics, unemployed black men gathered 
on a street corner, “taxi dancers”, rather than high government officials and 
economic entrepreneurs, are most likely to draw their attention. However, 
without really intending to, the interactionists have through nearly a century of 
research extended the domain of “rational choice”, broadly interpreted, to 
some of the most deviant and marginal of our fellow beings – including 
children, mental patients, the dying, street corner gangs, juvenile delinquents, 
prisoners, welfare mothers, and men seeking sex in public restrooms, just to 
mention a few. There is have little doubt that a fully rational account of the 
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latter could be constructed – in part because interactionist investigators have 
already largely done so. 
 
The Dismissive Responses 
 
A key question is whether Hayekians and interactionists can ever see 
past the stereotypes they hold about one another and begin to understand what 
they may have in common.4 Any reference to John Dewey serves to illustrate 
this point: Dewey had a productive career as a philosopher that spanned nearly 
60 years from his first important publications in the 1890s to his death in the 
1950s. He was an important expositor of certain interactionist ideas – notably 
the importance of experience in nature – as well as a friend and close 
professional colleague of G.H. Mead. He was, through much of that time, a 
relentless explorer and advocate of the importance of the individual in society 
and a stanch defender of personal liberty.  
For me, the immediate focus of this paper arose out of a recent essay in 
the once-again left-leaning New Republic, for which Dewey was once an 
important contributor. The essay was entitled with the portmanteau neologism 
Liberalterianism a term that describes a rather iconoclastic notion paralleling that 
explored in this paper. There is a convergence of interests and perspectives 
between some of the libertarian-leaning followers of Hayek and Mises, and 
some of the social liberal-leaning followers of Dewey and Mead.5 
Yet, such is the polarization of our intellectual life that I have personally 
observed on more than one occasion the way in which the merest mention of 
Dewey’s name among Hayekians will provoke dismissive responses amidst 
mumblings of “progressive education” and “socialism”. In the process, 
Dewey’s entire long and creative career as a fearless proponent of ideas will be 
immediately and summarily dismissed. I hasten to add, of course, that the 
merest mention of Hayek, Mises and Austrian economists to some audiences 
of interactionists, is likely to produce an equally dismissive reaction from the 
majority of those present. This issue becomes even more troublesome, with the 
mention of other names like Jane Addams, C. Wright Mills, an American 
intellectual gadfly, Jürgen Habermas, a notable German ex-Marxist on the one 
hand or Murray Rothbard.  
The central figures in this drama Hayek and Mises, of course, and the 
philosopher G.H. Mead and his symbolic interactionist interpreter Herbert 
Blumer are, to some extent simpler to deal with – except for active 
practitioners of guilt by association. All four are fairly “pure” intellectuals and 
we can concentrate on what they have to say about emergence and 
spontaneous order without having to consider a lot of this sort of extra 
baggage. My primary concern here, however, is not with comparative 
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I want to begin my consideration of interactionism and spontaneous 
order by suggesting that the interactionist concepts of situation and emergence 
offer important pointers to begin to identify and assess the interactionist case 
for spontaneous order. All models of rational behavior place emphasis on the 
connection between purposes, goals or ends and action, or the application of 
means. Interactionism is somewhat unique in its systematic emphasis on 
rational behavior as consisting of creative enactments. This is most evident in 
the interactionist conception of situation, not as a model of the objective 
circumstances surrounding a choice or event, but as the active construction of 
those involved. W.I. Thomas’s famous dictim to the effect that what is real is 
what those involved in a situation believe to be real illustrates this point. How 
can we determine, for example, whether any particular situation has the 
potential for the emergence of a spontaneous order? The interactionist 
response is that the only answer that makes any sense is to ask those in the 
situation whether they see such potential for such emergence. 
 
Situations as Emergent 
 
Thus, in addition to the usual themes of Hayekian spontaneous order – 
absence of central planning, spontaneity, uncoordinated plurality – 
interactionist perspectives on situation and emergence highlight two additional 
important themes  – novelty and indeterminacy. “Emergent events are events 
that contain novel features that are not entirely derived from antecedent events 
and experiences,” according to Meltzer and Manis in their introductory 
discussion of the interactionist approach to emergence. (1995: 180) 
The interactionist model uses many of the same indeterminate qualities 
that Hayekians attribute to the market and hidden hand to generalize about 
social behavior, but to move the locus of emergence beyond dependence on 
any particular social institution and make it a lemma of spontaneous order. 
Meltzer and Manis quote D.L. Miller’s summary of the perspective of George 
Herbert Mead on emergence: 
For Mead, the seat of reality is in the present, and presents are 
characterized by acts of adjustment, or by the novel, the 
emergent, that which could not have been predicted either in fact or in 
principle… (emphasis added) The emergent being unpredictable in 
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principle, does not follow logically from the world that was there, 
from conditions necessary for its emergence, from what is 
traditionally called its cause. 
Meltzer and Manis (1995: 181) interpret this, in conventional 
interactionist manner, to mean that “the sphere of the social is a creative, open-
ended process rather than a static structure.” According to the same authors, 
Herbert Blumer, the erstwhile father of symbolic interactionism, consistently 
argued that “novelty, uncertainty, and emergence are integral, not accidental or 
epiphenomental in human life.” (Meltzer & Manis 1995: 180) 
In literally hundreds of instances scattered throughout the interactionist 
literature, the interactionist concept of social process performs many of the same 
roles as the Hayekian concept of market production, yet generalizes and 
universalizes beyond this single institutional setting. Thus, the processual nature 
of social interaction noted by G.H. Mead and by these sources offers a couple 
of notable refinements over the Hayekian market model of emergence in this 
regard: The market condition for emergence is both conditional and narrowly 
situational.  It is conditional because markets, by definition, assume the 
conditions of large pluralities of both buyers and sellers and at least some 
interpersonal recognition of an underlying price mechanism as preconditions 
for spontaneous order to emerge. By contrast, the interactionist claim is more 
fundamental; it is that emergence is a universal characteristic vested in all 
human action regardless of social conditions; that it exists prior to any 
particular institutional claims. 
This in no way denies the role of markets as specific situations for the 
emergence of spontaneous order. Instead, it sets up a more general framework 
for identifying other occasions, institutions, and “social structures” in which 




The core of the Meltzer-Manis presentation of emergence in the 
symbolic interactionist tradition is their identification of three propositions for 
explaining emergence and spontaneous order as a condition of ordinary social 
life. The three are: 
1) Humans are active in shaping their own conduct;  
2) Rational thought involves a conversation with oneself6; 
3) Humans construct their behavior in the course of its 
execution; 
These are, fundamentally, restatements of the basic interactionist 
position staked out by Blumer above. 
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Selves and Others: I, Me and You 
 
The first of these is probably self-evident to a group of individualist 
Hayekians. Humans are, in President Bush’s famous neologism, deciders. The 
second and third take note of G.H. Mead’s complex concept of the self as 
consisting of both the spontaneous actions of the “I” and thought and actions 
directed toward oneself and others, which he termed the “Me” and Significant 
Others. The difference is easily demonstrated in a simple exchange involving 
these statements: “I called you yesterday, but no one answered”. To which the 
other replies: “I heard the phone ring. Was that you?” A question to which “I” 
answers “Yes. That was me. I guess I shouldn’t have called that early.” To which 
“You” responds “ Let’s set up a regular time for you to call.” 
These three sentences establish the main elements of the interactionist 
base model of social interaction which has powerful implications for 
emergence, and which is deeply embedded in ordinary language: A situation (in 
this case, one involving an exchange of comments about a second situation the 
previous day.) important meanings of which are shared by two actors, agents or 
deciders (termed the self and the other). In this case, the other is clearly a 
significant other, a fact that is situationally evident from the first pair of 
comments, which require no introductions, or elaborate explanation or 
justification to understand. It is evident from their words alone that these 
people know each other. The key to the Meadian concept of self, however, is in 
the last comments. The original self (I in situation 1) clearly now (in situation 2) 
recognizes him/herself (Me) in the previous event as a social object in the same 
sense that (s)he recognizes the significant other (You). Most important in the 
Meadian model, however, are the last two statements that together reflect the 
ability of the self (I, in situation 2) to regard itself (Me) on exactly the same 
terms as it regards the other (You) – in this case, recognizing two simple and 
equivalent evaluations of the situation.  
Further, I, Me and You in this exchange are all recognized not as 
separate decision points, but as continuities continuing from Time 1 to Time 2 
and presumably forward into time 3 (the time of future calls). However, this 
same self (I, or actually both Me and You’s own I) are capable of acting to 
change the situation: I am aware that you did not want to take my call and I will 
adjust my future behavior accordingly, precisely because I can act toward 
myself in precisely the same way I can act toward you. And I know you can do 
the same. But with your final statement you not only close the situation 
(evident by the fact that there are no more statements). You also set up the 
possibility of what interactionists call “joint lines of action”. In this case “we” 
(You and I) can act jointly to set a time for future calls. And thusly a new and 
spontaneous order emerges; one which allows you and I to reflect individually 
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and possibly act jointly. And regardless of which choice we make, either of us 
can ask: Is this new situation good for me? In this way, and particularly in 
“Your” ability to take “my” interests into account in your evaluation of your 
own actions and choices (and vice versa), a very powerful evocation of Adam 
Smith’s conception of self-interest (to which Alexis de Tocqueville applied the 
phrase Self Interest Properly Understood) emerges from the interactionist 
model.  
And, interactionist research has been very prolific in spelling out those 
connections – revealing the hidden hand, as it were. Full elaboration of this 
would require at least a book length monograph. We can only offer up a few 
illustrative examples here. 
 
Situations as Awareness Contexts 
 
Perhaps the most explicit treatment of spontaneous order in the 
interactionist literature is found in the various writings of Anselm Strauss on 
what he termed “negotiated order”. This perspective began to emerge in a 
study of dying patients in a hospital setting by Strauss and his colleague Barney 
Glaser. (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss 1963) Their study noted two 
approaches of the hospital staff to dying patients: One they termed closed 
awareness contexts, which were characterized by the absence of discussion or 
any form of explicit acknowledgement between medical staff and patients of 
the reality that patients were terminally ill. They concluded two things: that 
despite the lack of official confirmation, most dying patients were aware of 
their status; and 2) that the subject of the patient’s looming deaths was so 
“closed” as a subject that the silence could only be maintained by an active 
(albeit) tacit collaboration between staff and patients. 
This was at the time consistent with long-standing health care practice 
supposedly intended to “protect” patients from the overt knowledge of their 
own pending deaths, but also allowing medical personnel to avoid the harsh 
reality that their efforts were insufficient to spare the lives of their patients. 
They found, among other things, that most patients knew anyway that they 
were terminally ill. Glaser and Strauss contrasted this with “open awareness 
contexts” in which both medical staff and patients acknowledged awareness of 
the patient’s immanent death, and the subject could be openly broached by 
either party.  
Most importantly for our purposes here are the ways noted by Glaser 
and Strauss that these two contrasting situations – termed the awareness 
contexts – acted to constrain and limit the thinking, actions and decisions of 
everyone involved in the situation. In brief, they offer extensive detail of how 
mutual, unacknowledged or tacit cooperation among the medical staff and 
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patients in closed awareness contexts acted to reduce the range of possible 
social orders that might have arisen. In the language of spontaneous order, 
numerous emergent possibilities were blocked or precluded. Patients who 
wished to see old friends and acquaintances who might help them celebrate 
their lives (a distinct emergent order that might arise spontaneously out of the 
wishes of patients) were precluded from doing so by the need of patient and 
staff to deny that there was any reason for such an emergent event. 
This finding on the systematic role of situations in identifying and 
defining situational possibilities done 40 years ago still represents an important 




 The real payoff for an understanding of spontaneous order, however, 
comes from a second study by these same authors of the more general 
organizational processes of hospital structure, “The Hospital And Its 
Negotiated Order.” (Strauss 1963; Strauss 1978) Without taking too many 
liberties with this second study, one can suggest that, in contrast to the front 
office and organization chart musings of health care management, the reality of 
hospitals as experienced by those who work and are served there is of what I 
have come to term roving gangs of specialists, all of whom talk primarily only 
among themselves. In a slightly more formal manner we might report the 
finding that the social order (or social structure) of hospitals is a spontaneous 
order (which Strauss termed a negotiated order) that emerges from, and is 
constantly being “reinvented” by an unending series of negotiations. It is from 
these negotiations and not from the rules, policies and procedures manuals all 
of which tend to act only as constraints setting limits on behavior, from which 
the social order of the hospital emerges and is constantly socially reconstructed.  
 As a result, far from the orderly, hierarchical organization charts drawn 
up by management experts, the actual, emergent order of hospital life involves 
unending rounds of negotiation within and among small groups of specialists 
(including patients and family members; pity the poor patient left alone in a 
hospital setting without such a support group – usually termed by 




Close examination of the interactionist ouvre will reveal evidence of a 
number of remarkably vibrant libertarian themes also woven throughout the 
interactionist literature. Perhaps no piece of interactionist writing is more 
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clearly an illustration of this point than Erving Goffman’s Asylums, (1961) 
which offers a thorough and disturbing analysis of the systematic, 
dehumanizing, anti-individualizing and liberty-revoking character of what he 
termed “total institutions” – mental hospitals, military units and boarding 
schools, were the primary examples.  Although interactionists might be more 
inclined to frame Goffman in terms of “anarchist” or “dramaturgical” 
perspectives, the total institutions paper illustrates clearly the degree to which 
there is a very deep and wide libertarian-like streak in the interactionist 
literature. It is neither new nor particularly difficult to locate. And it also has 
implications for our theme of spontaneous order and emergence. 
As initial proof of that, I picked at random (by accident, actually) an 
interactionist text from my bookshelf. Symbolic Interactionism: An Introduction to 
Social Psychology7 was intended as one of those “best foot forward” introductions 
to the field aimed at undergraduate audiences. Along with the other standard, 
introductory topics, including a brief exerpt from Dewey’s “Mind, Experience 
and Behavior” (153-155) and Herbert Blumer’s anti-structuralist classic 
“Society as Symbolic Interaction” this introduction contains an 8-page 
discussion (180-187) by Bernard Meltzer and Jerome Manis, of “Emergence 
and Human Conduct” already mentioned. 
About the topic of emergence, Meltzer and Manis say further  “our 
interest relates to the indeterminacy found on both the individual and the 
collective level of human behavior.” They are concerned, they say, with the 
novel, the unpredictable, and the unexplained. They are, in other words, 
concerned with the emergence of spontaneous order. Emergence, in this sense, 
is a centrally important theme in interactionist writing, and deeply shapes the 
sense of social order held by interactionists.  
Many “structuralist” sociologists tend to see social order and change as 
virtually opposites, change being the transitory condition occurring only in the 
brief moments between the determining order of Condition A and the newly 
structured Condition B. At least five major differences from the 
structuralist/social determinist view of individuals “in” society are central to 
interactionism: 
1) A social worldview grounded not in collectivities, but in acting 
persons8 whose shared meanings and joint behavior those collectivities are. 2) 
An anti-structuralist sociology in which “social order” is viewed as the 
deliberate, and continual recreation of acting (and choice-making) individuals; 
3) An anti-quantitative methodology which rejects completely the notion that 
great insight is to be found in statistical generalizations; 4) An anti-objectivist 
epistemology, somewhat like the one Mises was struggling toward but never 
quite fully realized. The “grandstand” (objective observer) position is explicitly 
rejected. Social scientists may seek to step outside society and become 
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“objective” observers of social, economic or political reality by interactionists, 
but they can never quite get there. The best they can hope for is forms of inter-
subjectivity. 5) An acute awareness of the impact of time on perspectives. 
Interactionists are acutely responsive to Mead’s model of behavior as 
fundamentally and profoundly open-ended and future oriented. There are other 
systematic similarities here that might be noted, but these well illustrate the 
point. 
 
Constructivism Properly Understood 
 
As a final example of the systematic involvement of symbolic 
interactionism in spontaneous order, I want to introduce the controversial 
topic of social constructivism – in the famous words of Berger and Luckman 
(1967), the idea that reality itself is socially constructed. In suggesting this, they 
were alluding in part to the much earlier statement by their fellow interactionist 
W.I. Thomas to the effect that situations perceived as real are real in their 
consequences.   
In introducing constructivism, however, I hasten to point out that the 
interactionist conception is not the same as all of the popular 
misinterpretations propogated with this idea by assorted bands of “post-
modernist” relativists. I do not mean, in any sense, in other words, to suggest 
that the illusion of reality is socially constructed. That notion, in my view, belongs in a 
the same garbage can as the notion that Adam Smith’s concept of self-interest 
is a blanket endorsement of all forms of unconstrained selfishness. As the 
fictional Wanda Gershwitz tells her brother Otto, in the movie A Fish Called 
Wanda, “The central tenant of Buddhism is not every man for himself. I know, 
Otto. I looked it up.” Likewise, despite the clear textual evidence in the work 
itself, the Wikipedia entry on social constructivism, for example, finds the idea 
derived, among other sources, from Marx and Gransci! 
Taking a page from Wanda Gerschwitz, looking it up will confirm that 
the English language text of The Social Construction of Reality (1967) upon which 
constructivism is grounded is primarily a transliteration by Berger and Luckman 
of work done over many years by the phenomonologist Alfred Schutz and 
originally written in German. Schutz was heavily reliant on  Mead and thus, we 
can assume with confidence that  constructivism in the original is in no way a 
relativist doctrine as the post-modernists would have it. In an earlier period, 
Karl Mannheim used the term relationism to distinguish this approach from 
relativism. The essential point here would be to suggest that self-interest in the 
constructivist view is always an issue situated in a particular historical, political 
and social context, and that how narrowly or broadly it is interpreted is 
fundamentally an issue of meaningful construction of those involved.  
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Constructivism, emergence and spontaneous order are all of a piece 
from an interactionist perspective: Reality, order and change are all situationally 
grounded and their meaning and significance depends in the most fundamental 
sense on how those involved in and with the situation – including those 
observing and commenting upon the situation – individually and jointly 
construct their interpretations of it. In this case, we can predict that Hayekians 
and interactionists interested in spontaneous order and emergence can either 
continue to construct separate but parallel meaningful accounts of the reality of 
emergence and spontaneous order, or they can begin to compare notes more 
systematically and learn from one another. 
 
Conclusion: And Just as Certainly There are Differences 
 
We actually saw a genuinely marvelous example of the spontaneous 
social construction of a new world order in the years after 1989, and almost no 
one noticed this remarkable event.9 In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet 
Empire and associated events, we saw the spontaneous emergence of a new 
world order; one that we are all still struggling to make sense of, but clearly a 
fundamentally different reality than the cold war world it replaced. 
At the same time, we cannot afford to ignore certain real differences in 
perspective between the followers of Mead and the followers of Hayek. For 
most of us, the underlying differences were established – and positions were 
staked out – years, even decades ago, and we see little reason for 
reconsideration at this point. Yet, certain similarities are there. 
I wish to suggest modesty, cautiously and quietly (since I am not actually 
in attendance) that in the case of the concepts of spontaneous order and 
emergence, there are large areas of convergences to explore That makes this 
paper either a bit of an intellectual adventure or a fool’s errand; ultimately you’ll 
have to decide which it is. 
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1 My perspective has always been an interactionist one; albeit a somewhat maverick one (which in 
important respects puts me right in the mainstream of that orientation). I began my study of 
interactionism as an undergraduate in 1962 and was a founding member of the Society for the Study 
of Symbolic Interaction (SSSI) in the 1980s, and have presented papers at SSSI conferences in the 
past. (I am not currently a member, more out of considerations of time than of shifting perspective.) 
I have been working on applying insights from interactionism to a fuller understanding of rational 
choice and social action for most of my adult life. I also believe and have said publicly that society 
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was an illusion for reasons given by Herbert Blumer and Charles Horton Cooley years before 
Margaret Thatcher – with whom I shared few other political beliefs – was taken to task for making 
the same point in the 1980s. The contemporary interactionist perspective of “social constructivism” 
properly understood as relationism and not turned into a form of post-modern relativism, offers 
both Ms. Thatcher and I a better, more effective way to make that point. 
 
2 I am using the term “economic” here in Lionel Robbins’ classic sense of the study of human 
behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses. From this 
standpoint, any concern for organization, institution, or other manifestations of order is a secondary, 
even epiphenomenal, concern. At best, the economic concern for order is a matter of the appropriate 
application of the scarce resources necessary to create or maintain order. Again, this is not a 
fundamental concerns with order, - in this case, with describing or explaining the emergence of a 
particular kind of order – but only with the constraints on orderly creation. 
 
3 There is at least one major exception to this and that is the political scientist, Murray Edelman, who 
over a period of more than four decades beginning in 1964 published a remarkable series of books 
on politics as symbolic action. Many of Edelman’s themes (1964; 1971; 1974; 1977; 1985) bear 
directly on the problems of spontaneous order and emergence.  
 
4 Stereotype is one of the concepts that has generalized out of the interactionist tradition.  
 
5 David Prychetko offered up the beginnings of a very encouraging “liberalterian” analysis of the 
work of Jürgen Habermas a few years ago, but in the end he did what we all are inclined to do in 
such circumstances: He faulted Habermas for being insufficiently Hayekian.  
 
6 Their actual statement is “human conciousness, or thought, involves interaction with oneself.” 
Because of the centrality of rational thought as formative of rational choice in the Hayek tradition, I 
have abbreviated to get to the point. Although there are many important issues lurking in that 
abbreviation, I do not believe they materially alter the points made in this paper, so I am leaving their 
full exploration to another time and place. 
 
7 By Herman, Nancy J. and Larry T. Reynolds. 1994. Dix Hills NY: General Hall. 
 
8 One serious topic of contention, if care is not exercised, involves the interactionist concept of 
“person” which is generally preferred usage by interactionists to “individual.” Along with a 
systematic rejection of Cartesian dualisms, interactionists tend to reject the model of the fully 
autonomous “individual” as a misleading fiction. They tend to prefer, instead, the model of the 
individual “person” imbedded in a surrounding social life. In this way, many but not all of the 
features of the Hayekian “methodological individualism” are retained. This is a subject for future 
exploration. Adult persons, they might argue, can emerge into full autonomous individuality only 
after thoroughgoing socialization by family, friends and significant others. Yet unlike sociological 
structuralists, interactionists do not tend to see such socialization in deterministic terms as fully 
defining the social person. And, the paths to individuality – artistic or scientific creativity, deviance, 
or some other pathway – are deeply embedded in the interactionist model of emergence detailed 
below. 
 
9 World order is used in a significantly different way here than the usual meaning of the international 
political order of nation states. This new “order” is, in many respects considerably more complex and 
chaotic than the seemingly orderly “free world vs. communist order” dual polarities it replaced. In a 
more fundamental cognitive sense, however, it is a socioeconomic order nonetheless.  
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